Cannabis plants with Two Row Wampum-inspired beadwork and a Canadian government building

Cannabis Regulation in Canada: Patient Rights, Public Safety, or Protecting the Marketplace?

Written by Lindia Fazio When governments talk about cannabis regulation, public safety is usually the first justification we hear. Safety matters. But after more than two decades of involvement with medical cannabis, my husband and I believe another question deserves attention: how much of today’s cannabis policy is about protecting patients and consumers, and how much is about protecting an established commercial marketplace?

This question matters especially to Indigenous communities seeking to regulate cannabis according to their own laws and responsibilities. It also takes us back to the court battles that secured medical patients’ access to cannabis in the first place.

Patients Had to Fight for the Right to Grow

Canada’s medical cannabis access system did not begin simply because government decided patients deserved it. Court challenges forced governments to confront the constitutional consequences of denying reasonable access. The Marihuana Medical Access Regulations (MMAR) began in 2001. Later, the federal Marihuana for Medical Purposes Regulations (MMPR) sought to replace personal and designated cultivation with purchases from commercial licensed producers.

For patients with significant medical needs and limited incomes, that was not a minor administrative change. It could mean losing access to affordable medicine.

My husband and I were part of the coalition supporting the Allard challenge. We helped organize a fundraising event on Six Nations that raised more than $40,000 for the legal fight. We also both attended the Federal Court trial in Vancouver in 2015. This was personal to us: we had been involved in authorized medical cannabis cultivation since 2005, and we understood what patients stood to lose.

The Cost Evidence in Allard

The Allard judgment recorded striking differences between patients’ reported production expenses and commercial purchasing costs. Neil Allard reported spending about $230 a month to cultivate cannabis for an authorized 20-gram daily amount—roughly 600 grams a month, or about 38 cents per gram in ongoing expenses. The judgment also recorded estimates of $1–$2 per gram for other plaintiffs. Those figures did not erase substantial upfront construction and equipment costs; Mr. Allard, for example, reported approximately $35,000 in equipment and construction across three cultivation sites.

Even with those qualifications, the trial demonstrated why forcing patients to buy every gram from commercial suppliers could make treatment financially impossible. A price of $5 per gram meant $3,000 a month for someone requiring 20 grams daily. The question was not whether a commercial product existed. It was whether patients could realistically afford the quantities they had been authorized to use.

The Federal Court ruled in favour of the patients’ constitutional challenge to the restrictions. The lesson was that access to medical cannabis must be practical, not merely theoretical.

What We Learned in the Allard Courtroom

My husband and I both attended the Allard trial in Vancouver in 2015. We were there because the right to grow affordable medical cannabis mattered deeply to us and to the patients we supported.

The federal government presented evidence about fires, mould, policing and other risks associated with residential cannabis cultivation. Those risks deserved examination. But so did the quality of the evidence used to argue that patients should lose their right to grow.

Surrey Fire Chief Len Garis testified about fires associated with grow operations. During cross-examination, the court examined statistics distinguishing fires attributed to cultivation from fires at homes where cultivation was present but had not caused the fire. The figures discussed included 99 grow-related fires and 74 fires in the latter category in Surrey from 2005 to 2013. These figures did not establish how many involved legally authorized medical grows. Trial transcript, March 9, 2015, printed pp. 1194–1195.

The distinction is fundamental. A fire in a house where cannabis is grown is not necessarily a fire caused by cannabis cultivation. Justice Michael Phelan subsequently identified serious weaknesses in the government’s fire-risk evidence.

The court also heard testimony about mould and moisture. Enclosed growing systems, ventilation and dehumidification were discussed as ways to manage indoor environmental conditions. These measures do not eliminate every risk, but they demonstrate why the design, installation and maintenance of a grow matter when assessing safety. Trial transcript.

Corporal Shane Holmquist, an RCMP officer associated with the Coordinated Marijuana Enforcement Team, gave evidence about policing concerns. In his written decision, Justice Phelan sharply criticized the objectivity and reliability of Holmquist’s expert opinions and gave them little or no weight.

What we took away from the courtroom was not that home cultivation is risk-free. It was that serious restrictions on patients should be justified by dependable evidence, not broad assumptions that every medical grow presents the same dangers.

When Federally Licensed Cannabis Producers Break the Rules

One thing that has always bothered me is the suggestion that cannabis produced by a federally licensed company must automatically be safer than cannabis grown by an experienced craft grower. Federal licensing creates rules and oversight, and those protections have value. But Health Canada’s own records show that licence holders can fail to meet those standards, sometimes in serious ways.

Unauthorized pesticides: the problem was real

In 2016–17, recalls involving licensed medical cannabis producers, including Organigram and Mettrum, exposed unauthorized pesticide concerns. Health Canada subsequently investigated and acknowledged that some licensed producers had used unauthorized pest-control products. The problem was significant enough that the federal government developed mandatory pesticide testing, which took effect January 2, 2019. This was not a hypothetical risk; the government changed its testing system in response to documented problems. Health Canada: pesticide-testing background.

And it did not end with those early recalls. Health Canada’s 2024–25 inspection report records that Ono Cannabis Inc., in Quebec, received a stop-sale order on certain lots treated with an unauthorized pesticide following a July 24, 2024 inspection. Health Canada: 2024–25 inspection report.

What federal inspectors found in licensed businesses

These are not rumours about producers. They are examples taken from Health Canada’s published inspection tables:

– Lowbanks Grow (Ontario), November 21, 2023: Inspectors rated the licence holder non-compliant, citing false or misleading statements, unauthorized cannabis activities, inadequate records, failures to meet responsibilities and good-production-practice deficiencies. Corrective actions were required. – Vodis Innovative Pharmaceuticals (British Columbia), August 21, 2023: Inspectors documented false or misleading statements, unauthorized cannabis storage, security and labelling problems, and other deficiencies. Health Canada reported seizure and detention, witnessed destruction and a warning letter. – ArtisCannabis (Ontario), March 6, 2024: Inspectors documented obstruction of an inspector, improperly obtaining cannabis, unauthorized site-plan changes, security-clearance issues and production-practice deficiencies. Corrective actions were required. – Hybrid Infusions (Alberta), September 9, 2024: Inspectors cited analytical-testing non-compliance, unauthorized cannabis storage, labelling problems, inadequate records and production-practice deficiencies. Corrective actions were required. The company had also received a product hold following a 2023 inspection. – Lune Rise Farms (Ontario), October 2, 2024: Inspectors found testing deficiencies, unauthorized cannabis activities and distribution or storage, inadequate safeguards for samples, unsatisfactory recall strategies and production-practice problems. Corrective actions were required. – Argentia Gold (Newfoundland and Labrador), May 14, 2024: Inspectors documented a failure to disclose cannabis loss or theft, inadequate recall strategies, security-clearance issues, records problems and production-practice deficiencies. Corrective actions were required. – Culture Kizos (Quebec), June 21, 2024: Health Canada initiated a stop sale after inspectors documented unsatisfactory microbial or chemical contaminants in cannabis extract products, labelling problems and good-production-practice deficiencies. – Thrive Cannabis (Ontario), November 25, 2024: Inspectors documented unauthorized storage, recordkeeping and production-practice deficiencies; stop sale was initiated on multiple lots.

The 2023–24 examples appear in Health Canada’s 2023–24 inspection report; the 2024–25 examples appear in its 2024–25 report. Each report identifies the business, inspection date, rating and action recorded at that time. A finding does not establish that every problem was deliberate or remained unresolved.

How widespread were the findings?

Health Canada issued 21 non-compliant inspection reports to cannabis licence holders in fiscal 2023–24, and 37 in fiscal 2024–25. Those are inspection reports, not necessarily 58 different companies, and they should not be confused with all inspections conducted. The 2024–25 program conducted 889 inspections in total, including 197 inspections of registered personal or designated medical production. The licensed-business figures and medical-grow inspections cover different categories and should not be compared as if they were identical populations.

This does not mean most licensed producers break the rules. Many inspections resulted in compliant ratings, and the existence of a federal inspection and enforcement system is itself an important consumer protection. It does show that the claim that federal licensing guarantees safety is not supported by the government’s own experience.

What about laboratory testing and potency labels?

Testing matters, but no testing system is infallible. Sampling methods, laboratory procedures, product changes over time and labelling practices can affect the accuracy of reported potency. We should not claim that every questionable THC label is deliberate manipulation. What we can say is that independent, credible testing and transparent enforcement matter more than a reassuring label alone.

None of these examples proves that unlicensed cannabis is automatically safe. The point is that public safety should be measured through actual production practices, testing, transparency and accountability—not assumed from the existence or absence of a federal licence.

I believe Six Nations and other Indigenous communities should have a meaningful opportunity to establish their own credible testing, training and regulatory systems. Experienced craft growers can mentor newer growers, and community standards can be designed around real risks. If governments say their concern is safety, then practical cooperation on testing and accountability deserves serious consideration.

The Licensed Market Expanded, and Prices Fell

After recreational legalization in 2018, Canada’s regulated cannabis market experienced rapid investment and expansion. Production capacity grew, competition intensified, and prices fell. Some businesses struggled with losses, debt, or closures. Government licensing created the framework, but companies also made their own investment and expansion decisions; the resulting oversupply cannot fairly be attributed to government alone.

Lower retail prices might sound like good news for consumers, but the industry’s economics became difficult for many producers. Meanwhile, patients purchasing through the medical system still faced substantial costs compared with some of the home-production expenses presented in Allard. Today’s prices and the true all-in costs of home growing vary, so historical courtroom figures should not be presented as universal current costs.

The Tax Burden Did Not Fall With Prices

Canada’s regulated cannabis market expanded rapidly after recreational legalization, and wholesale prices fell. Yet the fixed-dollar component of the cannabis excise-duty system remained. For dried cannabis, the coordinated duty generally uses the greater of a fixed amount equivalent to $1 per gram or a percentage of the dutiable amount, subject to provincial adjustments and applicable rules. The exact duty can be higher, particularly in Ontario.

The arithmetic illustrates the pressure: a $1-per-gram duty represents about one-third of a $3-per-gram selling price and half of a $2-per-gram price. These are illustrations of the fixed component, not complete tax calculations or retail price comparisons. The Competition Bureau has recognized that falling prices made excise duties a greater burden relative to producer revenue.

Why Not Address the Tax Burden First?

If governments are concerned that licensed cannabis retailers are losing business to Indigenous dispensaries, why aren’t they doing more to address the costs built into their own regulated system?

Licensed producers have watched cannabis prices fall dramatically, yet the fixed-dollar excise-duty component has remained. Governments could examine the excise-duty structure, regulatory fees, and other costs that make it difficult for licensed businesses to compete.

Instead of treating Indigenous cannabis businesses primarily as an enforcement problem, why not address the financial pressures within the licensed industry while working with Indigenous communities on testing, safety, and accountability?

Lowering taxes would not necessarily solve every problem facing licensed retailers. The duty is generally paid by licensed producers, and a reduction would not automatically be passed through to retail customers. Nor does the industry’s financial distress prove that protecting commercial profits is the motive behind a particular enforcement action. But reducing regulatory costs is a policy option worth examining.

Indigenous communities should not automatically be expected to bear the consequences of financial pressures within a cannabis marketplace they did not design.

Indigenous Regulation and the Question of Competition

When governments discuss enforcement against cannabis businesses outside the federal and provincial systems, they frequently cite consumer protection, product testing, and the integrity of the legal marketplace. Those are different policy objectives, and they deserve to be examined separately.

I believe there is a legitimate question about whether protecting licensed businesses from competition is influencing decisions that also affect Indigenous communities. That is a question, not a proven claim about the motives of any particular official or government.

Six Nations has experienced craft growers and people who want to learn. Our community should not be dismissed as incapable of setting or enforcing meaningful standards. There is room for independent testing, accurate labelling, training, accountability, and community-led regulation. Those safeguards need not depend exclusively on participation in the federal commercial licensing model.

The legal questions surrounding Indigenous jurisdiction are complex and continue to be contested. Acknowledging that complexity does not mean abandoning the principle of meaningful Indigenous self-determination. Governments should engage with communities about how public safety and Indigenous regulatory authority can work together, rather than treating commercial licensing as the only possible route to responsibility.

What Allard Still Teaches Us

The Allard trial showed why governments must support restrictions on patients with reliable evidence and account for the real-world cost of access. It also demonstrated the importance of questioning expert claims, distinguishing actual hazards from assumptions, and considering safer practical alternatives.

We believe those lessons remain relevant today. Protecting consumers matters. So do affordability, patient choice, transparent testing, and Indigenous communities’ ability to shape their own future.

A cannabis policy should be judged by the safety, fairness, and access it delivers—not simply by the number of licences issued or the commercial interests it protects.

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